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PURPOSE 
OF THESIS 
INTRODUCTION 
W as Descartes' doubt universal? was it 
real? What kind of doubt was it? The chief 
3 
aim of this thesis is to answer the first of these ques-
tions, that is, to examine the scope or extension of 
Descartes' doubt. Incidentally, it glances at some other 
aspects of the doubt. The solution given is based on a 
study of the philosopher's methodological works. These aee: 
Discours de la M~thode 
Meditationes de Prin~ Philosophia 
Principia Philosophiae 
Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii 
Rgcherche-de la V~rite 
In addition, the chief passages deal~g with doubt in the 
letters of Descartes, and in the Objectianes ~ Reseonsio-r 
nibus Authoris, are also cited. 
Before on~e can understand with some degree of fullness 
anything at all, one must see that thing in relation to its 
milieu. Accordingly, the v.l,-'en~ng cha.;.-ter of this thesis 
aims to furnish the background, neces5ary to the examination 
of our problem: the universality of Descartes' doubt. This 
"background" cbal'ter will be follo·wed by a ch.a.vter on terms 
which includes a note on the critical problem. Chapters 
three and four will contain the evidence for and ag,.dnst 
the universality of Descartes' doubt. And since the question 
of the reality of the doubt spontaneously flows out of that 
of its universality, the evidence for and against the reality 
-of the doubt will also be briefly indicated. This is 
followed by a word about the "metaphysical 11 quality of hhe 
doubt. 
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The conclusion of this thesis is that Descartes' doubt 
was metaphysical and real. That it was metaphysical is 
certain, as it is almost certain that it was real. Con-
cerning the central problem under investigation, the results 
of this thesis lead us to the conclusion that Descartes 
was illogical and inconsistent: at times he calls his doubt 
universal; at other times, and more frequently, he asserts 
that it is not universal. 
REASON FOR 
THESIS 
If reason be sought for studying the question 
of the universality of Descartes' doubt, perhaps 
the best reason is the importance of the man who used that 
doubt as a philosophical instrument. Descartes has oeen 
in the past, and very likely will continue to be in the 
future, the centre of much attention in the world of phil-
osophy. He has had ardent followers and even more ardent 
enemies. To him belongs the honour (or dishonour) of 
fathering modern philosophy. His followers make him "le 
liberateur de la philosophie jusque lA esclave.nl His 
enemies blame him with originating practically all the evils 
and "isms" which have plagued the world since his day. 2 
~batever one's attitude towards Descartes, one cannot deny 
his supreme moment in the history of modern thought, and 
consequently,of modern civilization. Whether, then, Des-
cartes is considered as one of the greatest enemies or as 
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one of the greatest benefactors of our modern world, surely 
it is useful to seek as accurate an under~tanding as possible 
of the doubt which played a paramount role in the scientific 
and philosophical enquiries of a man of such stature.3 
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FOOTNOTES TO THE I1~RODUCTION 
1. Ma ritain, p. 40 
2. ib., passim, viz., pp. 247-286. M. Maritain, for example, 
charges Descartes with destroying theology, and pre-
paring the destruction of meta1)hysics. He calls Descartes 
the father of rationalism, pragruatism, naturalism, 
agnosticism, mechanism, materialism, etc. 
3. Cf. Veitch, Introduction, p. 11; Archives, Verneaux, p. 88. 
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY NOTIONS. 
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THE 
TIJilES 
Liberator of the human spiritJ That phrase in-
dicates the atlllosphere of the tiwes in which Des-
cartes lived. His was an age of revolt against authority,l 
a revolt, in the field of philosophy, inspired in 1-•art by 
the fa iling condition of scholasticism. Descartes' age, 
moreover, witnessed a general confusion of minds caused by 
'"' the lack of solid philosophical traditions.~ Besides this, 
Descartes' age was one of sceptici~ru. This current of scep-
ticism was strong enough to launch Descartes upon his cri-
tical studies.3 It is not hard to see how, living in 
such an age, Descartes would himself revolt against tradi-
tion, such as it was, and doubt all of its findings. This 
is not to say that Descartes• was a sceptical doubt. Far 
from being that, its very purpose was, as we shall see di-
rectly, to refute sce~ticism. 
Keeping in mind the wood of the times in which Des-
cartes grew to manhood, we see how reasonable is the gene-
sis of Descartes' method given by M. Chevalier: 
Descartes nous indique nettewent les trois 
etapes par lesquelles a passe la forn~tion 
de son esprit. Il a dtabord etudie dans les livres; 
mais ils sont trop eloignes de l'usage commun. 
Puis il a etudie dans le grand livre du monde; 
mais l•experience instruit, et ne dirige pas. 
Enfin il s rest l'esolu A s retudier lui-m~me, 
pour y chercher le fondement de certitude ••• 4 
Descartes doubted all the knowledge discovered to his day; 
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he doubted his own experience; and it was only in reflection 
upon himself that he finally found, or at least felt, 
certitude. 
PURPOSE We have reniarked above that Descartes' 
OF DESCARTES 
purpose in doubting was not scepticism. It 
waa quite the reverse: 
••• le doute wethoa.ique de Descartes ••• est pour 
ce grand raisonnable, quelque chose dtanalogue 
A la !!! purgativa des mystiques, A cette tnuit 
obscure de lt&~e' dont parle saint Jean de la 
Croix, ~ar laquelle il faut pas~er pour parvenir 
A la lumi~re eternelle du vrai.5 
Descartes doubted in order to reach certitude. 
Descartes himself tells us that his doubt was not 
sceptical but methodical, that is, having certitude as its 
goal: 
••• pour toutes les opinions que i'avois receUes jusques alors en ma creance, ie ne pouvois mieux 
faire que dtentreprendre, une bonne fois, de les 
en oster, affin d'y en remettre par apres, ou 
d•autres meilleures, ou bien les mesrues, lors~e 
ie les au:x:ois ajust~es au niueau de la raison. 
Descartes' doubt was, then, a methodical doubt. 
But it was more than that: 
EVOLUTION 
OF lJfr."'THOD? 
••• m~thodique. Cela ne signifie pas seulement 
qu'il est applique methodiquement A toutes les 
opinions, et aux fonaements m~mes de ces opinions, 
ce qui concerne plut8t son universalite; mais 
beaucoup plus profondement cela signlfie qu'il 
est la condition de la decouverte de la verite. 
Ltadjectif methodique doit ~tre pris au sens 
strict: le doute est la methode m~me perme1tant 
de trouver un jugeruent absolument certain. 
M. Verneaux thinks there was a gradual 
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evolution of Descartes' method, a transition from reflexive 
analysis (in the Regulae), by way of.evidence (in the 
Discours), to methodical doubt (in the Meditationes). 8 
To us this does not seem to be the case. It seems more likely 
that Descartes got his method all at once. It appears to 
have come to hiru the night of his famous dream in the 
November of 1519 • 
••• ie deweurois toutle jour enferrue seul dans 
un po~sle, ou i'avois tout le loysir de mtentre-
tenir de mes pensees •·· ie me persuaday ••• que 
pour toutes les opinions que i'auois recettes jusques alors en ma creance, ie ne pouuois 
mieux faire que dtentreprendre une bonne fois de 
les en oster, affin dty en remettre par apres, 
ou dtautres meilleures, ou bien les mesrnes ••• 9 
In this passage from the Discours, Descartes tells us 
that the idea of his methodical doubt had come to him, 
already fully developed, in 1619. Now the works in which 
M. Verneaux traces an evolution of Descartes' method (viz., 
the Regqlae, Discours, and Meditationes) were all published 
many years after 1619. Therefore there seems to have been 
• 
no substantial change in the method: Descartes had already 
com~ upon it, all at once, during his dream of November, 
1619.10 
TWO ELENili"NT S ~~ereas Descartes' method underwent no 
essential change, it consisted, as M. Verneaux aptly points 
out, of two elements, analysis and doubt: 
Notanda autem hie sunt duo haec: nihil nimirum 
falsuru pro vero1fu~ponere, et ad omnium cogniti-onem pervenire. 
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••• et si forte, ut saepe contingat, vias omnes, 
quae ad illam (rem petitam) hominibus patent, 
potueriwus perlustrar€, liceat audacter asseeere, 
supra omnem ingenii huwani captum positam esse 
ejus coanitionem.l2 
As these yassages imply, Descartes' method was not a bald 
doubt. Rather it was a cycle of analysis-doubt-analysis. 
If analysis revealed anything dubitable in a matter, 
Descartes doubted. If further analysis removed all dubious 
elements, he, of course, ceased doubting. 
OBSCURITY We should like to conclude this preliminary 
chapter with a few words concerning the difficulty of defi-
nitely determining the nature of Descartes' doubt. The 
reason for this is Descartes' lack of clarity, and his il-
logicality and vacillation when he speaks of his method. 
As M. Maritain points out,13the distinguishing charac-
teristic of Descartes' philosophy is the multitude of con-
tradictions it contains, contradictions wh~ch Descartes in 
no way attempted to solve. The same ambiguity and vague-
ness which surrounas the other writings of this French 
poet-philosopher also clouds his explanations of his 
doubt. As a result, even in Descartes' day there was dis-
agreement as to the kind of doubt Descartes held. As we 
shall see, the same difference of opinion prevails today. 
Some of the difficulty in grasping the exact purport 
of Descartes' doubt may also be due to the fact of its 
gradual change. For if there was no essential change of 
Descartes' method, there do seem to have been fluctuations 
within that method. The extension of the doubt may have 
varied in the course of years. Now it seems to include 
more, now less. In truth, by its very nature Descartes' 
doubt was bound gradually to cl~nge. He himself says as 
much: 
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••• et faisant particulierement reflexion, en 
chasque matiere, sur ce qui la pouuoit rendre 
suspecte, et nous donner occasion de nous mesprendre, 
ie deracinois cependant de mon esprit toutes les 
erreurs qui s 'Y estoient pft glisser au1-'aravant • .14 
These words show that Descartes did not rid himself of 
all his opinions at once, but that he set about this task 
quite gradually, rejecting only those opinions whose 
. 
examination had failed to supply him with clear evidence 
of their truth. This can give some plausibility to Ver-
neauxrs opinion that Descartes' method went thru a gradual 
evolution. However we believe it more true to say that 
the method was unchanged but was applied to a broadening 
field. 
FOOTNOT~S TO CHAPTER I. 
1. Veitch, Introduction, pp. 9-10 
2 • i b • , I». 11 
3. Marechal, p. 37 
4. Chevalier, p. 40 
5. ib., p. 212 
6. AT, 6.13 
7. Archives, Verneaux, pp. 25-26 
8. ib., pp. 18-24 
9. AT, 6.11-13 
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10. This point is disputed. Some say that during his famous 
"songen Descartes discovered his analytcal geqmetry, 
and not his methodical doubt. 
11. AT, 1o.e12 
12. AT, 10.389 
13. Maritain, pp. 54-59 
14. AT, 6.28 
CHAPTER II. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS. 
The general background of Descartes' doubt has been 
sketched in the preceding chapter. Before taking up the 
study proper of the doubt, it is necessary to define the 
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chief terms which will recur again and again on almost every 
page of this thesis. These terms are concerned with the 
two states of the mind known as doubt and certitude. 
STATES 
OF MIND 
The understanding of the various kinds of doubt 
and certitude, as these words are used in the 
following pages, will be aidea by briefly outlining the 
chief states of the mind. Thus it will appear what sort 
of mental state the present writer conceives doubt in general 
and certitude in general to be. 
There are, then, five states of the mind: ignorance, 
doubt, suspicion, opinion, and certitude. This division 
has for its basis that complex act of the mind kno~n as 
a judgment. In the first three states, ignorance, doubt, 
and suspicion, there is ~ act of judgment, that is, there 
is no assent of the mind, actual or implicit, to the knoWB 
objective identity or diversity of two ideas. In opinion, 
the mind does assent, but its assent is uncertain, the 
motives calling for assent are mere suasive or probable 
motives. In certitude, the mind grants its assent, and its 
certain assent, because the motives inclining it to assent 
14 
are certain motives.l 
A more precise definition of doubt and certitude is 
now in place. Doubt is a "suspension of the mind (assent) 
between both parts of a contradiction." In the state of 
doubt, the mind is afraid that it may be in error. Certi-
tude may be defined as "the firm adhesion of the mind to 
one part of a contradiction, without any fear of error.n2 
In other words, in the state of doubt and in that of 
certitude the mind wants to pass a judgment on some object. 
But in the state of doubt the mind either does not see that 
object clearly enough, or for the moment turns itself away 
from that object. That is the reason why a doubting mind 
hesitates to pass judgment on an object. The reverse is 
true in the state of certitude. Here too the mind wishes 
to make a judgment concerning an object. A nd here the 
object appears so clearly to the mind that it cannot but 
judge correctly of that object. 
KIND S 
OF DOUBT 
Next, may be given the various kinds or divi-
sions of doubt. Doubt can be divided into three 
classes. If one looks at the reason for the suspension of 
assent, doubt is called positive doubt, when the "suspension 
is the result of an a~parent equality of mot~ves.n3 It 
is called negative doubt, when the nsuspension is the result 
of lack of motives." If one considers the way in which llhe 
doubt takes place, it is called either real doubt or 
15 
fictitious doubt. A real doubt is had when the mind truly 
assents to some truth, but acts as though it were suspending 
its assent. If one focuses ones attention on the end for 
which one doubts, the doubt may be either methodical or 
sceptica 1. A methodical doubt is "any suspension which 
is used according to a definite plan in order to acquire 
knowledge." In other words a doubt is methodical when it 
is used as a means to ~be finding of truth. A sceptical 
doubt, on the other hand, is a doubt "which is cherished 
as a definite state of mind with a view to the possession 
or retention of truth." For eX&lll_ple, I have a definite 
and certain view about something; this causes me to re-
gard every other view with the eye of a sceptic. Or it 
may be that my view is not certain; but I do not wish to 
change it, as this might involve a change in my life, my 
attitude towards things: I employ scepticism towards all 
views different from my own, as a defense against sur-
rendering my view. 
ABSTRACTION A word may be inserted here about "abstrac-
tion." This state of mind is often called a doubt; but 
to call "abstraction" a doubt is to misunderstand the 
meaning of the word. "Abstraction" refers to one of the 
various methods used in solving the critical problem, the 
problem of the validity of human cognition. The philo-
sopher who thus "abstracts" retains all the certitudes, 
natural and philosophical, which he possesses at the time. 
The point to note here is that thus nto abstract" is not 
in any way, not even fictitiously, to doubt. This same 
method of abstraction is sometimes expressed in the formula 
employed by St. Au~stine: 
QUaerendum est quasi omnia essent incerta.5 
"Abstraction," then, is a 11determinatio voluntatis parata.e 
ad inquirendum eodem ~ ~ inquirit realiter dubttans de 
objecto particulari, verbi gratia, de immortalitate a-
nimae ••• n6 
KINDS OF 
CERTITUDE 
We may now briefly enumerate the chief di-
visions of certitude. To begin with, certitudes 
may be explicit or implicit. By means of an explicit cer-
16 
titude I know a thing "in actu signato;" in such a certi-
tude there is direct 8.!ld expli·ci t a:·ttention of the mind to 
the thing which is known as true. But certitudes may also 
be implicit. Indeed, in every explicit certitude are con-
tained other implicit certitudes, chief among which is the 
cognition of my mind's aptituue for truth. By an implicit 
certitude I know a thing "in actu exercito;" in such a 
certitude the mind does not directly nor in the first place, 
but only secondarily, attend to the truth known in that 
implicit certitude.7 
Certitude is also divided into purely subjective cer-
titude ru1d objective certitude. Purely subjective certi-
tude is no certitude at all; for it merely signifies "ipse 
assensus firmus sine formidine errandi." This assent, 
however, is not elicited by certain motives; and for this 
reason purely subjective certitude often proves erroneous. 
Objective, or formal, legitimate, real, perfect, absolute 
certitude, is 
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••• assensus firmus in veritatem ex ruotvo in-
fallibili (excludente possibilitatem erroris) 
clara cognitio, sive exercite sive8signate, (adest) huius infallibilitatis ••• 
• • • 
Now follows a very important division of certitude. 
Certitude may be metaphysical, physical, or moral. This 
division o·f certitude corresponds to a like division of 
universality, necessity, possibility, impossibility, re-
pugnance. To understand this division of certitude, it 
will be helpful first briefly to define the various kinds 
of necessity, metayhysical, physical, and moral. The 
definitions are taken from Father Frick: 
Metaphysice necessarium est quod in ipsis rerum 
ideis seu essentiis fundatur ita, ut ne per 
divinam quidem omnipotentiam aliter esse seu 
fieri possit ••• 
Physice necessarium ••• est quod in rerum 
natura ita fundatur ut per solam Dei onmipo-
tentiam aliter esse seu fieri possit ••• 
Moraliter necessarium ••• est, quod ita nititur 
in constantibus rationalis naturae aoribu~, 
inclinationibus, ut contradictorium, licet 
physice possibile sit seu physicas hominis 
vires non excedat, tamen propter oppositionem 
vel incongruitatem cum natura rationali non 
fiat. 9 
Using "necessity" as a basis, Father Frick gives the 
following concise definitions of the various kinds of ob-
jective certitude, metaphysical, physical, and moral: 
Necessitas haec (ruetaphysica) objectiva alicui 
menti manifesta est certitudo metaphysica 
objectiva. 
Necessitas physica objectiva alicui menti mani-
festa e~t certitudo ppysica objectiva. 
Necessitas moralis objectiva alicui menti mani-
festa est certitudo moralis objectiva.lO 
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Metaphysical certitude is absolute certitude; physical 
and moral certitude constitute hypothetical certitude. 
But hypothetical certitude is no les::; truly certitude 
than is absolute certitude. Both fulfil all the require-
ments of true and perfect certitude. 
A NOTE ON THE CRITICAL PROBLEM. 
Descartes' doubt takes much of its importance from 
the fact that it played so imyortant a role at the birth 
of the critical problem, the core problem, today, of that 
branch of philosophy known variously as .Major Logic, Critica, 
or the Theory of Cognition. To solve this central cri-
tical problem, Descartes employed his doubt. 
Accordingly, to see the bearing and significance of 
Descartes' doubt in clearer perspective, it is necessary 
briefly to describe the nature of the critical problem and 
to outline the chief methods used in solving that problem. 
Thus it will be easier to see the position of Descartes' 
doubt in the history of the science of Critica. 
DEFINITION ~bat, then, is the critical problem? In 
a larger sense, the term is used to include the threefold 
problem of scepticism, relativism and idealism. In a 
stricter sense, however, the critical problem is concerned 
only with the sceptical problem. Taken in this stricter 
sense, the critical problem deals with an inquiry into the 
mind's aptitude for truth and certitude. ttis the human 
mind apt for true and certain knowledge?",-- this question 
may be called ~ critical problem. 
19 
VARIOUS 
SOLUTIONS 
Many ways have been proposed of solving this 
pro.blem of the illind' s aptitude for truth. These 
various solutions may be classified into those that deny 
the mind's aptness for truth, and those that affirm it. 
The denial of the mind's aptitude is the solution of the 
sceptic. Those who affirm the validity of human knowledge 
fall into those who claim that there is no possible way 
of showing or proving this validity; and those who say 
we can prove the validity of human knowledge. To the 
first class belong the exaggerated dogmatists, for example 
the fideists and voluntarists. 
Those who assert that the objectivity of human know-
ledge can be demonstrated, again separate into those who 
employ some sort of doubt to arrive at this demonstration 
,........ 
~----------------------------------------------------------~ 
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and those who employ other methods. 
Descartes, who is generally considered the first in 
modern times seriously to have examined the critical prob-
lem, belongs to those who employ a doubt. Descartes' doubt 
was, it is said, a real, positive doubt. A positive doubt 
is one in which the "ratio suspensionis est propter appa-
rentem aequalitatem motivorum." A negative doubt, on the 
other hand, is one in which the "ratio suspensionis est 
defectus motivorum." A real negative doubt was the solution 
offered by Sentroul, Jeanni~re, s. J., Picard, s. J., and 
Marechal, s. J. Cardinal Mercier, Donat, s. J., and Geny, 
s. J., held a fictitious doubt to be the correct solution. 
In greatest favor today are those who claim to demon-
strate the validity of the mind by other methods than 
doubt. The chief names in this class are Bonnet, s. J., 
(who employs "abstraction"), Naber, S. J. (who employs 
nreflexion"), and a group including Mattiusi, s. J., De 
Tonquedec, s. J., Maritain, Boyer, s. J., Calcagno, s. J., 
who, to use the words of one of them, solve the mind's 
aptitude by a 
formalis perceptio aptitudinis10no~ in actu signato, sed in actu exercito. 
It is well to note that the word "demonstrate," as applied 
to this last group, does not refer to a strict, syllogistic 
demonstration.. This obviously would involve a "petitio 
principii." But "demonstrare aptitudinem mentis" here 
rather means "wonstrare 11 : !Q ~ the mind's reliability 
bY seeing that reliability in the act of reflection. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTBR II. 
1. Frick, pp. 38 ff.; pp. 128-130 
2. ib., pp. 128-130. n. For a lengthier discussion of the 
nature of certitude, the reader way consult Frick, pp. 
130 ff. 
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3. st. Thomas, 14.1. "Motive," as it is used in this dis-
cussion, is merely a synonym for "object," which appears 
to the mind more or less clearly, or with equal clarity 
from several aspects. 
4. Naber, p. 98 
5. St. Augustine, Lib. 2, c. 3 
6. Bonnet, pp. 28-30 
7. Frick, p. 109; Boyer, pp. 175-176 
8. ib., pp. 130-132 
9. ib., pp. 139-140 
10. For a further discussion of the various solutions of 
the critical problem, consult Bonnet's Critica, pp. 
22-78; Naber's Theoria Co~itionis Critica, pp. 93-109; 
and Marecha.l's Point duD part~.!§: M~tap:hysigue, vol. 
5, pp. 38-53. 
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CHAPTER III 
ARGUMENTS FOR A UNIVERSAL DOUBT. 
We are now ready to take up our problem proper. In 
the present chavter we give the reasons which have led many 
to the conclusion that Descartes' doubt was universal. 
DESCARIDES' 
TESTIMONY 
If we read through Descartes' works, we 
shall find a good many statements which argue 
the universality of his doubt. For example, in the Discours, 
he says, 
••• commenqant des lors a ne conter pour rien 
les mienes propres (opinions), a cause que1ie les voulmis remettre toutes a l'examen ••• 
(Yet, a closer examination of that very passage shows that 
Descartes is certain that he has four maxims of morality 
which may guide him during his doubt. More about these 
later.) 
In the Meditationes we discover another seeming proof 
of a universal doubt: 
In prima (Meditatione), causae exponuntur propter 
quas de rebus omnibus~ praesertim materialibus, 
possumus dubitare ••• 
Simila r in tone are these words, occurring a few pages 
further on: 
Animadverti jam ante aliquot annos quam multa, 
ineunte aetate, falsa pro veris admiserim, et quam 
dubia sint quaecumque istis postea superextruxi, 
ac proinde funditus omnia semel in vita esse ever-
tenda atque a primis fundamentis denuo inchoandum 
opportune igitur hodie mentem curis omnibus • • • 
exsolvi, securum mihi otium procuravi, solus 
secedo, serio tandem et libere generali huic 
mearum o~inionum eversioni vacabo.3 
The "universal" doubt seems to have extended at least 
to all sense knowledge: 
Cernis equidem, de Olliilibus rebus quarum cognitio 
non nisi ope sensuum ad te pervenit, cum ratione 
dubitare te posse ••• 4 
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But here Descartes' doubt was only an ap~rent and illusory 
doubt. For the validity of sense perception is a self-
evident truth, that is, one which we cannot in actual fact 
doubt. In view of this, we should already have to say that 
Descartes' doubt was at most apparently universal, an 
illusory universal doubt. 
But let us suppose for a moment that the doubt was 
truly universal; immediately we shall have to qualify the 
adjective "universal." Certainly Descartes did not start 
out by at once doubting every one of his certitudes with 
a separate, individual doubt. As we have seen, he set about 
gradually to rid himself of all dubious opinions. But, as 
he himself says, when he came to the opinion "I think," 
it was impossible for him to doubt his existence. So that 
!e never doubted at least the one truth of his own exis-
tence. If, then, one insists on calling Descartes' doubt 
universal, one can call it a universal doubt only in the 
sense that Descartes set out to examine ~ of his opinions. 
In this view universal would mean not that all the opinions 
were considered doubtful, but that they were all ~ubjected 
to analysis, in order to discover those particular truths 
of which a metaphysical doubt could not be had. 
TESTIMOh'Y 
OF OTHERS 
Thus far we have seen only what Descartes 
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himself says about the universality of his doubt. 
There are some authors who hold that the doubt was in fact 
universal. We quote the statements of two writers who 
cling to this opinion, M. Verneaux and .Mr. Sewall. The 
former says: 
Le doute est universal ••• tel que Descartes le 
presente en maint passage, il est clair que rien 
n'est except~ de cette "abdication.n5 
Sewall writes: 
Vfuat has given Descartes a unique hold upon the 
thought of modern times is his making the mind's 
position of universal dgubt the proper starting 
place in philosophy ••• 
AN INST-ANT? Let us grant that the authors who claim 
that Descartes' doubt was universal are right. How long, 
in that case, did Descartes' universal doubt last? Des-
cartes himself answers this question: 
••• ie me resolu ae feindre que toutes les 
chases qui m'estoient iamais entrees en l'esprit, 
n'estoient non plus vrayes que les illusions de 
mes songes. Mais, aussitost apres, ie pris garde 
que, pend~it que ie voulois ainsi penser que 
tout estoit .faux, 11 .falloit necessairement que 
moi, qui le pensois, .fusse quelque chose. Et 
remarquant que cete verite: ie pense, done ~ ~~ 
estoit si ferme et si assur69; que toutes les 
plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques 
ntestoient pas capables de l'esbransler ••• 7 
If Descartes' doubt was truly universal, that universal 
doubt -- even in the manner in which we have just qualified 
the word "universal" -- lasted but an instant. 
AN ABSTRACTION? By way of comment on these arguments 
26 
for the universality of Descartes' doubt, we venture the 
theory that Descartes' "universal" doubt was more of an 
"abstraction" than a doubt. This view seems to be supported 
by one of the most famous passages in Descartes' works: 
Utar hie exemplo valde familiari, ad facti mei 
rationem ipsi ex9licandam ••• Si forte haberet 
corbem pomis pler~m, et vereretur ne aliqua ex 
pomis istis essent putrida, v~lletque ipsa auferre, 
ne reliqua corrumperent, quo pacto id faceret? 
An non in primis omnia omnino ex corbe rejiceret? 
ac deinde singula ordine perlustrans, ea sola, 
quae agnosceret non esse corrupta, resumeret, 
atque in corbem reponeret, aliis relictis.8 
The application is, of course, that in a similar way a 
man exaruines all his judgments in order to reject the false 
and retain the true. Surely, no man who has a basket of 
apples, fears that they are all bad. Descartes himself 
says that a man may suspect "~" of the fruit is spoilt, 
that is, he may suspect or know that some of the apples 
are really bad. But what does he do? He examines all of 
the apples, good and bad alike. He does this, not because 
he fears that all are spoilt -- in that case he would not 
examine the fruit to find out which was spoilt, but rather 
to find out which was sound. The reason, then, for the 
examination is to find out which of the apples are spoilt. 
~--------------------------------------~ 
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Of course, the man examines all the apples, one by one. 
He looks over the good apples as if they might be spoilt 
too. In this sense, he treats all the apples alike. Yet 
not for a moment does he really think all of the apples 
might be bad. In like manner, Descartes did not for a 
moment really think that all his juugruents were uncertain. 
But like the man with the basket of fruit, he was afraid 
some of his judgments might be bad, in this case, uncertain. 
To find out which were the uncertain judgments, Descartes 
proceeded to examine all of his judgments, one by one, 
good as well as bad. For a moment. he acted in regard to 
all of his judgments ~ though they might be false; but 
not even for a moment did he think that they ~ all 
uncertain. This, at any rate, appears to be a likely 
explanation of his "universal" doubt. In so far as the 
doubt was "universal," it was not a doubt at all, but an 
abstraction, in the sense in which we have explained that 
term in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ARGUlimNTS FOR A NON-UNIVERSAL DOUBT. 
If there are quite a few statements in Descartes' 
works that seem to bespeak a Ul~iversal doubt, there are 
equally as many, indeed, there are far more numerous passages 
in Descartes which argue a non-universal doubt. We may 
begin this chapter by selecting from Descartes' writings 
some more or less general affirmations of the non-univer-
sality of his doubt. 
DESCARTES' 
TESTIMONY 
In the Regulae Descartes implicitly denies 
the possibility of an universal doubt: 
••• si Socrates dicit se dubitare de omnibus, 
hinc necessario sequitur: ergo hoc saltem intel-
ligit, quod dubitat; item, ergo cognoscit aliquid 
posse esse verum vel falsum, etc., ista enim1 naturae dubitationis necessario annexa sunt. 
In the Discours he says he aimed to reject (doubt) 
only unreasonad opinions: 
••• ie ne voulu point commencer a reietter tout 
a fait aucune des opinions, qui stestoient pd 
glisser autrefois en ma creance sa:z.s y auoir 
este introduites par la raison ••• 
A few pages further on in the Discours, Descartes lays a 
similar restriction on his doubt. He says that the doubt 
takes in only those opinions which can be suspected of not 
being entirely certain • 
••• ie pensay qu'il faloit que ie fisse tout 
le contraire, et que ie reiettasse, comme abso-
lument faux, tout ce en qugy ie pourrois ima-
giner le woindre doute ••• 
In the Meditationes we are again told that the doubt 
extends only to matters which contain some dubitable ele-
ment: 
••• jam ratio persuadet, non minus accurate ab 
iis quae non plane certa sunt atque indubita.ta, 
quam ab falsis assensionem esse cohibendam ••• 4 
On another page we find this certitude: 
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••• si hoc ejus (Dei) bonitati repugnaret, talem 
me creasse ut semper fallar, ab eadem eti~m vi-
deretur esse alienum permittere ut interdum fallar; 
quod ultimum taman non potest dici.5 
If Descartes has only this one certitude, he obviously does 
not doubt all thing~. 
In the RechercLe, simultaneously with the declaration 
of his universal dot~.bt, Descartes tells us of yet another 
csrt1tude he possesses: 
••• adactum me videam ad confitendum, nihil cum 
aliqua certitudine me scire, sed de omnibus 
dubitare, et in nulLa re certum asse.6 
In the same little essay, Descartes limits his doubt to 
inexact knowledge: 
••• 11 faudroit aussy que chaque homme ••• se 
resolust une bonne fois d'oster de sa fantaisie 
tuutes les idee7 iwparfaites qui y ont este tracees 
iusqu'alors ••• 
The Objectiones £Bm Responsionibus provide us with a 
rather insistently repeated denial of the possibility of 
a universal cioubt. 
Ex his autem (quae clare ab intellectu percipiuntur) 
quaedam sunt tam perspicua, simulque tam simplici~, 
ut numquaw possimus de iis cogitare, quin vera 
esse credanus: ut quod ego, dum cogito, existam; 
quod ea quae semel facta sunt, infecta esse non 
possint, et talia, de quibus manifestum est bane 
certitudinem haberi. Non possumus enim de iis 
dubitare, nisi de ipsis cogitemus; sed non pos-
sumus de iisdem cogitare, quin simul credamus 
vera esse, ut assumptum est; ergo non possumus 
de iis dubitare, quin siwul credamus vera esse, 
hoc est, non possuwus unquam dubitare.B 
In the Principia we again see that Descartes' doubt 
was not universal. For example, in tl1is passage, we find 
Descartes asserting the certain fact of free will: 
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Libertatem arbitrii esse per se notam: Quod autem 
sit in nostra voluntate libertas, et rnultis ,ad 
arbitrium vel assentiti vel non assentiri possimus, 
adeo manifestum est, ut inter prima.s et maxime 
collllllunes notiones, quae nobis sunt innatae, sit 
recensendum. Patuitque maxime paulo ante, cum 
de omnibus dubitare stu<ientes, eo usque su><JUS 
progress!, ut fingeremus aliquem potantissimum 
nostrae originis authorem modis omnibus nos 
fallere conari; nihilominus enim hance in nobis 
libertatem esse experieaarnur, ut possemus ab iis 
credendis abstinere, quae non plane cert<il. erant 
et explorata. Nee ulla magi• per se nota et 
perspecta esse possunt, quam quae tunc temporis 
non dubia videbantur.9 
In another part of the Principia Descartes can once again 
be heard denying the universality of his doubt: 
Praeter caetera autem, meruoriae nostrae pro 
summa regula est infigendum, ea quae nobis a 
Deo revelata sunt, ut omnium certissirna credenda.lO 
In the Principia, too, Descartes tells us what he 
means when he uses the expression "we must doubt all things." 
"All" is not as universal as we might think. This is 
proved by the wording and explanation of the first two 
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principles: 
I. Veritatem inquirenti, semel in vita de onmibus, 
quantum fieri votest, esse dubitandum.ll 
Follows the explanation of principle one: 
••• de iis omnibus studeamus dubitare, in quibus 
vel minimam incertitudinis suspicionem reperiewus. 
From this is is clear that we are to doubt only those things 
about which a doubt is possible, only those that are not 
certain. 
In the explanation of principle two, also, we are 
told that all things does not nave a universal extension: 
Quin et ~ etiam, de guibus dubitabimus, utile 
erit habere pro falsis, ut tanto clarius, quidnam 
certii2imum et cognitu facillimum sit, inveni-
amus. 
Surely the "illa." implies that we will by no means doubt 
everything, that we have some opinions which are indubitable. 
Lastly, there is among the annotations to the Principia 
a statement in which we are explicitly told that we must 
not include all things in our uoubt. The doubt is to be 
employed only when we have good reasons for using it. 
The writer tells us that there are cases where such 
reasons do not exist: 
TESTIMONY 
OF OTHERS 
CWD habetur positiva ratio quae aliquid persuadet, 
non esse metaphysicas illas dubitationes in 
contra.rium adnJittendas, quae nulla prorsus ratione 
fultae ponuntur: ut an forte Deus voluerit 
mentem annihilare, quoties destruitur ejus 
corpus .13 
Enough for what Descartes more or less 
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directly tells us about the non-universality of his uoubt. 
We shall now glance at a few opinions that others hold con-
cerning this same point. One of the best known stuuents 
of Descartes of our day, M. Chevalier, holds the non-uni-
versality of the doubt: 
Ce doute, d'abord n'est pas un doute universal 
Descartes commence par soustraire au doute la 
pratique et ses principes.l4 
Keeling, a leading English writer on Descartes, voices a 
similar view: 
He (Descartes) is going to test all manner of 
common beliefs ••• all in f~ct except those 
concerning morals and religion ••• methodical 
doubt is thus the general decision to aoubt 'on 
principle' any particular belief or class of 
beliefs that can be doubted.l5 ___ ...;;;;;;.;;;,.;;;;.:;;...;..:,.;;;;;; 
Veitch, who above asserted the universality of the doubt, 
implicitly agrees with Chevalier and Keeling: 
••• 
Descartes was led to seek for an ultimate ground 
of certitude ••• in what commended itself to him 
as self-verifying and tnerefore ultimate 1n 
knowledge -- in other words, a limit to doubt, 
a criterion of certainty ••• 16 
From the quotations here given, it seems very likely 
that Descartes' doubt was not universal. Indeed the whole 
point of doubting with Descartes was to get to something 
which he would be unable to doubt, so as to make this in-
dubitable thing the basis of his philosophy. Moreover, the 
conclusion that Descartes' doubt w&s not universal is richly 
supported by the countless individual explicit and implicit 
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certitudes contained in those very pages of Descartes where 
he explains his doubt. We shall now take up, first, some 
of these explicit certitudes; then we shall look at some 
of the implicit certitudes. 
DESCARTES' Among the various explicit certitudes which 
EXPLICIT 
CERTITUDES accompany Descartes' explanations of his doubt, 
we discover, to begin with, that Descartes seerus to have 
had nJany certitudes about non-existing things (his doubt 
was chiefly concerned with th~gs that existed): 
Atque ubi dixi hanc propositionem, ego cogito, 
ergo sum, esse omnium primam et certissimam, 
quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat, 
non ideo negavi quin ante ipsam scire oporteat, 
guid sit cogitatio, quid existentia, quid certitude; 
item, guod fieri !!Q!! possit, ut id quod. cogitet 
B2ll existat, et talia; sed quia hae sunt simpli-
cissimae notiones, et· quae solae nullius rei 
existentis notiti~ praebent, idcirco non censui 
esse numerandas.i 
Descartes never denied the certitude of dozens of truths 
which did not involve existence. 
In the Discours, in the very breath in which Descartes 
says he must aoubt, he tells us of several particular cer-
titudes he possesses. I select one: 
••• il nty a eu que les seuls Mathematicians 
qui ont pft trouuer quelques demonstrations, 
c'est a dire ~uelques raisons certaines et 
evidentes ••• ra 
This brings us to a very interesting class of certi-
tudes concerning knowledge or certitude itself. The 
Regulae are full of these certitudes. In Rule VII, for 
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example, Descartes is sure that there is such a thing as 
certitude: 
Eorum, quae hie proponuntur, observatio necessaria 
est ad illas veritates inter cert&s admittendas 
••• solius enumerationis auxilio fieri potest, 
ut ad quamcuruque (questionem) animam applicemus, 19 de illa semper fer.a.mus iudicium verum et certuru ••• 
••• si tamen vel minimum quid omittamus, catena 
~~a~~20st, et tota conclusionis labitur certi-
In Rule IX we find that Descartes is sure of the existence 
of knowledge and truth: 
••• atqui notandum est illos, qui vere sciunt ••• 
facilitate dignoscere veritatem ••• 21 
Descartes is certain, moreover, about the existence 
of and distinction between truth and falsity. On the very 
first page of the Regulae, Descartes assures us of the 
existence of science, that is, truth: 
Nam cum scientiae onmes nihil aliud sint quam 
humana sa~~entia, quae semper una et eadem 
manet ••• 
And, as we have already seen, Descartes is sure that the 
ancients reached truth: 
••• eoaem mentis lumine • • • Philoso1,hiae etiam 
et Matheseos veras ideas agnoverint ••• 23 
Again, Descartes tells us that we should go about our 
search for truth, separating truth from falsity: 
••• qualis de qualibet re cogni~io vera esse 
possit aut falsa, distinguatis.~4 
Having already received this piece of advice from Descartes, 
r we are not surprised to hear, a moment later: 
Intelligimus autem per qu:aestionem, illa,.,omnia. 
in quibus reperitur verUlll vel falsurn ••• ~5 
Further on in the Regulae, Descartes has certitude 
that there are what he calls "purely intellectual" (pure 
intellectuales) objects of knowledge. 26 He is sure, too, 
of the existence of "simple natures" and of their self-
evidence.27 He is also certain that some people may err: 
••• evidens est nos falli, si quando aliquam 
ex naturis istis simplicibus a nobis totam 
non cognosci judicemus ••• 28 
Closely related to these certitudes about the exis-
tence of knowledge, true ana false, is the certitude that 
other people have certitude. That Descartes was ce~tain 
of this already appears in- some of the quo-tations just 
cited. Here we give a few more statements on this ~oint: 
••• quoties aliquid certum et evidens feliciter 
invenerunt (scriptores), nur1quam exhibent nisi 
variis ambagibus involutum ••• 29 
••• eodem mentis lumine, quo virtutem volupta.ti, 
honestumque utili praeferendum esse videbant 
(veteres), etsi, quare hoc ita esset, ignora-
rent, Philosophiae e~e,ani et Matheseos veras 
ideas agnoverunt ••• 
Since Descartes was certain of the possibility and 
existence of knowledge, one would naturally also expect 
him to be-certain about the existence of faculties of 
knowledge. And so it is: 
In nobis quattuor sunt facultates tantum qu~~us 
ad hoc (rerum cognitionem) uti possimus ••• 
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However,the doubting Descartes goes far beyond the 
assurance that we have four faculties. He possesses cer-
titude regarding the trustworthiness of these faculties: 
of his ideas, intuitions, his reasoning, his memory, his 
senses. In a ~ord, he has no doubt about the aptitude of 
the mind for truth. 
It is useful to examine separately Descartes• cer-
titude about each of the faculties we have mentioned. 
First, there are ideas. Does Descartes doubt them? 
We have hinted that Descartes excluded from the scope of 
his doubt self-evident, indubitable judgments. From this 
it .follows that he cherished no doubt about ide.as; for 
judgments are made of ideas. Chevalier confirms this 
view: 
Le doute m~thodique s•~tend done' tous les jugements, mais non pas aux id~es en tant qu'i-
d~es.6~ 
P~re LeBlond offers us further testimony of this exclusion 
from the doubt, of ideas: 
••• certes Descartes ne doute nullement que les 
choses ne r~pondent aux id~es ••• 33 
Just as Descartes is certain of the validity of his 
ideas, so too is he certain of the validity of his intui-
tions: 
••• hie recensentur omnes intellectus nostri 
actiones per quas ad rerum cognitionem absque 
ullo. deceptionis metu possimus ~ervenire: 
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admittunturque tantum duae, intuitus scilicet 
et inductio.34 
The san1e thought occurs in this passage: 
Postquam aliquot propositiones simplices sumus 
intuiti ••• ad mentis intuitum duo requirimus: 
nempe ut prop~~itio clare et distincte ••• 
intelligatur.u5 
M. Chevalier likewise believes that Descartes did not 
doubt the certitude of his intuitions: 
Ce contact de son esprit avec la source de toute 
verite, qui constitue son intuition premi~re ••• 
La connaissance intuitive est Ulle ••• connai-
ssance premi~re, gratuite, certaine ••• 36 
In his Descartes, Chevalier ae;ain expresses the same 
opinion: 
••• pensee, certitude, existence, et que pour 
penser il faut ~tre (which is an intuitive judgment), et autres chases semblables ne 
auraient ~tre mises ici en compte (that is, 
cannot be included within the scope of the 
doubt) ••• 37 
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Certain of the objectivity of his ideas and intuitions, 
Descartes also seems not to doubt the validity of his 
reasoning faculty. Thus in the Regulae we find many state-
ments of Descartes' certitude on this point. Here are 
some exrunples: 
*ad 
NotandUili insuper, experientias rerum saepe esse 
f.allaces, deductionem vero, sive illationem 
puram unius ab altero ••• numquam male fieri ab 
intellectu vel minima rationali ••• hie recen-
sentur omnes intellectus nostri actiones, per 
quas*rerum cognitionem absque ullo deceptionis 
metu possimus pervenire: admittunturgue tantum 
duae, intuitus scilicet et inductio.38 
r 
Eorum quae hie proponuntur observatio necessaria 
est ad illas veritates inter certas admittendas, 
quas supra diximus a primis et per se notis 
principiis non immediate deduci.39 
For other proofs that Descartes was certain of the validity 
of deduction, the reader is referred to AT, 10.390, 400, 
411, 444. 
Concerning the memory, we find an indication that 
Descartes was certain about the workings of this faculty 
also, for he says of it: 
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••• memoria, a qua pendere dictum est certitudinem 
conclusionum, quae plura complectuntur quam 
uno intuitu capere possimus ••• 40 
Finally, it seems that Descartes was even certain, 
at bottom, about the validity of his senses. As proof of 
this may be cited these passages: 
Dicimus sexto, naturas illas, quas compositas 
appellamus, a nobis cognosci ••• quia experimur 
quales sint ••• Experiruur quiquid sensu per-
cipimus, quidquid ex aliis auciimus, et genera-
liter quaecumque ad intellectum nostrum, vel 
aliunde perveniunt, vel ex sui ipsius contem-
platione reflexa. Ubi notandum est, intellectum 
a nullo umquam experimento decipi posse, si 
praecise tantum intueatur rem sibi objectam ••• 41 
Nemo enim tam hebeti ingenio est, qui non per-
cipiat se, dum sedet, aliquo modo uifferre a 
se ipso, dum pedibus insistit ••• 42 
Quis autem unquam dubitavit (certainly Descartes 
never did), quin corpora moveantur, variasque 
habeant magnitudines et figuras ••• 43 
From these excerpts it would seem that though Descartes 
often asserted the need of doubting all sense knowledge, 
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he did not, in fact, doubt the trustworthiness of his senses. 
What conclusion is one to draw from the foregoing 
affirn~tions of certituae about the various individual 
faculties? It seeas to me that the obvious and logical 
deduction is that Descartes was, in actual fact, and quite 
consciously, certain of the aptitude for truth of his 
faculties of knowledge. And indeed, to be logical, Descartes 
had to admit the validity of his powers of cognition. For, 
as we shall see, he excluded self-evident truths from his 
doubt. Now the validity of our faculties is precisely a 
self-evident truth. So, if he were consistent ar1d accurate, 
Descartes could not, of course, entertain any doubt about 
his faculties. 
We come now to another and quite important group of 
opinions about which Descartes never had any doubt. First 
in this group is Descartes' certitude about self-evident 
truths. Descartes asserts that even the simplest peasants 
perceive these truths: 
••• saepe litterati tam ingeniosi esse solent, 
ut invenerint modum caecutiendi etiam in illis 
quae per se evidentia sunt atque a rusticis 
nunquam ignorantur ••• 44 
He also tells us: 
Nihilque sup~onam ex istis disciplinis, nisi 
forte quaedam per se not.a et unicuique obvia 
It may be well to give here a few examples of the 
self-evident truths perceived by the doubting Descartes 
••• 
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himself. Chief of his self-evident certitudes is the one 
on which he builds his philosophy, the certitude of his 
existence. We have seen instances of this certitude already. 
In Descartes• correspondence we find repeated affirmations 
of this basic certitude. He tells us that though we may 
doubt all the things of sense, we can in no way doubt about 
our own existence: 
••• puis nJontrer que celuy qui doute ainsi de 
tout ce qui est materiel, ne peut aucunement 
pour cela douter de sa propre existence; d'o~ 
il suit que celuy-la, c•est A dire l'ame ••• 
est la premiere chose qu'on puisse connoistre 
certainement ••• 46 
In another letter, Descartes expresses his astonish-
ment that anyone should consider the fact that he thinks 
as on the same level with the things that we may doubt: 
Pour le Docteur qui dit que nous pouuons douter 
si nous pensons ou non, aussi bien que de toute 
autre chose, il choque si fort la Lumiere Natu-
relle, que ie m•assure que personne, qu!7pensera a ce qu'il dit, ne sera de son opinion. 
In yet another letter, Descartes affirms at some 
length the impossibility of doubting the fact of thought: 
Mais si l•on veut conclure son existence du sen-
timent ou de !'opinion qu'on a qu•on respire, en 
sorte qu•encore mesme que cette opinion ne fust 
pas vraye, on iuge toutesfois qu'il est impossible 
qu•on l•eust, si on n•existoit, on conclud fort 
bien; a cause que cette pensee ae respirer se 
presente alors a nostre esprit avant celle de 
notre existence, et que nous ne pouuons aouter 
que nous ne ltayons pendant que nous ltauons ••• 
Et ce n•est autre chose a dire en ce sens-ll 
~ respire, done .1& suis, sinon ~ pense, ~ 
1& suis. Et si l'on y prend garde, on trouuera 
que toutes les autres propositions desquelles 
nous pouuons ainsi conclure nostre existence, 
reuiennent a cela mesme ••• 48 
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Finally, in one of his letters where he briefly sketches 
the development of his philosophy, Descartes once again 
asserts the certainty he possesses about the existence of 
his soul. 
Or je prouve aysement qu 'ils {the first p~·in­
ciples of Descartes' philosophy) sont tres-clairs: 
premierement, par la faqon dont je les ay trouuez, 
A s~auoir en rejettant toutes les choses aus-
quelles je pouuois rencontrer la moindre occasion 
de douter; car il est certain que celles qui n'ont 
pft, en cette fagon estre rejettees, lorsqu'on 
s'est applique ales considerer, sont les plus 
evidentes et les plus claires que l'esprit 
humain puisse coru1oistre. Ainsi, en considerant 
que celui qui veut douter de tout, ne peut 
toutefois douter qu'il ne soit, pendant qu'il 
doute, et que ce qui raisonne ainsi, en ne 
pouuant douter de soy-mesme et doutant neantmoins 
de tout le reste, n'est pas ce que nous disons 
estre nostre corps, mais ce que nous appellons 
nostre ame ou nostre pensee, j'ai pris l'estre 
ou l'existence de cette pensee pour le premier 
Principe, duquel j'ai deduit tres-clairement 
les suivans: l s~avoir qu'il y a un Dieu, qui 
est autheur de tout ce qui est au monde, et qui, 
estant la source de toute verite, n'a point cree 
nostre entendement de telle nature qu'il se 
puisse tremper au jugement qu'il fait des choses 
dont il a une perception fort claire et fort dis-
tincte. Ce sont la tous les Principes dont je 
me sers touchant les choses immaterielles ou 
Metaphysiques, desquels je deduits tres-claire~ 49 ment ceux des choses corporelles ou Physiques ••• 
Descartes is sure,furthermore: 
••• guid sit cogitatio, quid existentia, quid 
certitude; item, guod fieri BQQ possit~ ut id 
quod cogitet ~ existat, et talia ••• ocr--
r 
Emphatically, Descartes asserts the indubitability and 
self-evidence of the fact of free will: 
••• nihilominus enim hanc in nobis libertatem 
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esse experiebawur, ut possemus ab iis credendis 
abstinere, quae non plane certa erant et exploaata. 
Kec ulla magis per se nota et perspecta esse 
possunt, quam §uae tunc temporis non dubia 
videbantur ••• 1 
Descartes' certitude about mathematics is, at the 
most, only a shade less decided than his certitude about 
self-evident truths. A few quotations may bring this out • 
••• tantummodo rectum veritatis iter quaerentes 
circa nullum objectum debere occupari, de quo 
non possint habere certitudinem Arithweg~cis et 
Geowetricis demonstrationibus ~equalem. 
Cum enim nihil in illis (Arithmetica, Geometria, 
etc.) maneat occultum, et tota cognitionis 
humanae capacitati aptentur ••• 53 
In the passage we are about to give next, Descartes almost 
appears to give the mathematicians an exclusive monopoly 
on certitude: 
••• il nty a eu que les seuls Mathematicians 
qui ont pft trouuer quelques demonstrations, 
ctest a dire §uelques raisons certaines et 
evidentes ••• 4 
Almost as strong are these words: 
••• atqui Arithmeticam, Geometriam, aliaque 
ejusmodi ••• aliquid certi atque indubitati 
continere. Nam sive vigilem, sive dormiam, 
duo et tria simul juncta sunt quinque, qua-
dratumque non plura habet latera quam quattuor; 
nee fieri posse videtur ut tam perspicuae veri-
ta.tes in suspicionem falsitatis incurrant.55 
Then there is Descartes' certitude about faith and 
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morals. His words about these matters are quite unequivoc~l. 
There are many passages like the following, in,which 
Descartes calls our certitude about faith the strongest of 
all certitudes: 
••• quod tamen non impedit quominus illa, quae 
divinitus revelata sunt, omni cognitione certiora 
credamus ••• 56 
Another familiar thought of Descartes concerning revealed 
truth is this one, in which he plainly removes revelation 
from the touch of his doubt: 
••• a~rant apr is • • • que les veri tez revelees, 
qui y (to heaven) conduisent, sont au dessus 
de nostre intelligence, ie n•eusse ose les sou-
wettre a la foiblesse de mes raisonnenJens ••• 57 
This same thought recurs a few pages later on, where Des-
cartes' well kno~n maxims of morality are put in the same 
class with revelation: 
Apres m•estre ainsi assure de ces maximes, et 
les avoir mises a part, avec les veritez de la 
foy, qui ont tousiours este les premieres en ma. 
creance, ie iugay que, pour tout le reste de rues 
opinions, ie gguuois librement entreprendre de 
m'en defaire. 
In this same passage Descartes tells us of at least 
four concrete truths which he has no intention to rid him-
self of, or in other words, which he does not mean to doubt. 
These four truths are his four maxims of morality, which 
we enumerate here: 
La premiere estoit d'obeir aux lois et aux cous-
tumes de mon pa1s, retenant constanment la 
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religion en laquelle Dieu m•a fait la grace 
dtestre instruit des mon enfance, et me gouvernant, 
en toute autre chose, suiuant les opinions les 
plus moderees, et les plus esloignees de l'exces, 
qui fussent communement receUes en pratique par 
les mieux sensez de ceux avec lesquels i'aurois 
a viure. 
Ma seconde maxime estoit d'estre le plus ferme 
et le plus resolu en mes actions que ie pourrois, 
et de ne suiure pas moins- constanment les opinions 
les plus douteuses, lorsque ie m'y serois une 
fois determine, que si elles eussent este tres 
assurees. 
Ma troisieme maxime estoit de tascher tousiours 
plutost a me vaincre que la fortune, et a changer 
mes desirs que l'ordre du monde; et generalement, 
de m'accoustumer a croire qu'il n'y a rien qui 
soit entierement en nostre pouuoir, que nos 
pensees, en sorte qu'apres que nous auons fait 
nostre mieux, toucrumt les choses qui nous sont 
exterieures, tout ce qui manque de nous reussir 
est, au regard de nous, absolument impossible. 
Enfin, pour conclusion de cette Morale, ie mtauisay 
de faire une reueu~ sur les diverse occupations 
qu'ont les hommes en cete vie, pour tascher a 
faire chois de la meilleure; et sans que ie vueille 
rien dire de celles des autres, ie pensay que ie 
ne pouuois mieux que de continu~r en celle la 
·mesme ou ie me trouuois, c•est a dire, que dtem-
ployer toute ma vie a cultiver ma raison, et 
m•auancer, autant que ie pourrois, en la connoi-
ssance de la verite.t suiuant la Methode que ie 
m'estois prescrite.o9 
In these four maxims of morality we have at least four 
definite truthb which Descartes explicitly withholds from 
his doubt. 
Less important explicit certitudes, but still deser-
ving mention, are those Descartes had concerning the ef-
ficacy of the method of Doubt and the futility of Dialectics. 
r 
In the same breath in which he bids his reader to doubt, 
he claims that he has proven to the reader with certitude, 
therefore indubitably, the fruitfulness of the method he 
proposes: 
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Ex quibus omnibus colligitur primo, distincte ••• 
nos exposuisse ~·· nullas vias hominibus patere 
ad cognitionem certam veritatis, praeter evi-
dentem intuitum, et necessariam deductionem; 
item etiaw, quid sint naturae illae simplices ••• 60 
Of course, Descartes himself was certain of the value of 
his method. Thus, in the Discours, he tells us that as 
he was about to put his method into practice, 
••• par elle, i'estois assure dtuser en tout 
de ma r.aison, sinon parf-aitement, au moins le 
mieux qui fust en mon pouuoir.61 
Complementary to his confidence in his own method, is 
his certainty about the futility of Dialectics: 
Atqui ut adhuc evidentius appareat, illam 
disserendi artem nihil ow1ino conferre ad 
cognitionem veritatis ••• 62 
We shall conclude this section on the exJ?licit certi-
tudes that surround Descartes' doubt with several other 
examples. In the Discours Descartes assures us that at 
the time when he was thinking of adopting his method of 
doubt, 
Ie sc;avois que les langues qu•on y apprent, sont 
necessaires pour l'intelligence des livres 
anciens; que la gentillesse des fables resueille 
l'esprit; que les actions lliemorables des histoires 
le releuent, et qu'estant leues avec d.iscretion, 
elles aydent .~ former le iugement; que la lecture 
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des bons liures est comme une conuersation auec 
les plus honnestes gens des siecles passez ••• 
et mesme une conuersation estudiee, en laquelle 
1ls ne nous decouurent que les meilleures de 
leurs pensees; que l'Elo~uence a des forces et 
des beautez incoruparables; que la Po~sie a des 
delicatesses et des douceurs tres rauissantes ••• 
que la Iurisprudence, la Medecine et les autres 
sciences apportent des honne'!trs et des richesses 
a ceux qui les cultiuent ••• o3 
In a similar strain, Descartes expresses his certain views 
on the nature of Poetry and Rhetoric, and on the involved 
nature of Philosophy.64 How could Descartes doubt ,any of 
these things? Were they not made clear to him by his own 
certain intuitions or deductions? 
It is well to pause for a moment and look at the con-
sistency, or lack of it, in Descartes' stand. Even as he 
bade us to doubt, we have seen him expressing his certi-
tude about the existence of knowledge, about the trust-
worthiness of the faculties of Knowledge, about the excel-
lence of his method, about the nature of the various 
subjects studied in school. On the other hand, he seems 
to have considered his doubt universal (cf. Ch. 3), in the 
sense in which we speak today of a universal doubt as an 
attempted solution of the critical problem. In the one 
case, he holds a non-universal, in the otner, a universal 
doubt. Manifestly, such a position is illogical and 
inconsistent; but it seems to have been the position of 
Descartes: at times he called his doubt universal; at other 
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times, he was equally clear, i:f not more so, in considerably 
restricting its scope. 
DESCARTES' With these remarks we may close the consi-
Il~iPLICIT 
CERTITUDES deration of those certitudes which Descartes 
held or affirmed more or less explicitly. Mingled with 
these "explicit" certitudes, are :found wany implicit certi-
tudes. Some of these are too important to pass over with-
out mention. In the next section, therefore, we shall exa-
mine a few of the more important of these implicit certi-
tudes. 
As our first instanc•, we may t.ake this passage :from 
the Regglae: 
Expositis duabus intellectus nostri operatio-
nibus, intuitu et deductione, quibus solis 
ad scientias autiiscendas utendum esse diximus ••• 65 
Even a cursory examination of this sentence will reveal a 
host of implicit certitudes: Descartes is cert.ain that 
he has a personality, that he has been writing, that his 
writing took some time, that there is such a thing as time, 
that he is now in the present, that he has more than two 
faculties, that the understanding seeks truth, that he has 
a mind, etc., etc. In like manner one could. take every 
page of Descartes' writings concerning his doubt, and one 
would discover on each page innumerable implied certitudes 
such as those we have just seen. 
It should be remarked here, that implicit certitudes 
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of the type just enumerated do not express Descartes' own 
attitude towards certitude. On the contrary, he objectively 
denied such implicit certitudes, that is, he considered 
himself as doubting them; but logically, he necessarily 
implied these certitudes. In the light of this fact, such 
implicit certitudes merely show concretely the psycholo-
gical impossibility of a universal doubt. Descartes tried 
to convince himself that he doubted things about which he 
really possessed certitude. Again, an illogical position. 
Also calling for a word or two of comment are Des-
cartes' implicit statements of certitude about the efficacy 
of his method, about knowledge, about the aptitude of the 
wind, and about the impossibility of doubting what is 
self-evident. We have already seen Descartes explicitly 
affirm his belief in his method. We find the same certi-
tude implied in his works. He is sure, for example, of 
the usefulness of the directions he gives: 
Sed insuper advertendum est, n~ximam &~jus re-
gulae utilitatem in eo consistere ••• 
The statement of Rule XI also implies the same certitude: 
Regula XI: Postquaw aliquot propositiones sim-
plices sumus intuiti, si ex illis aliquid .aliud 
concluda.mus, utile est easciem continuo et 
nullibi interrupto cogitationis motu percurrere, 
ad lliutuos illorum respectus reflectere, et plura 
simul, quantum fieri potest, distincte concipere: 
ita enim et cognitio nostra longe certior fit, 
et maxime augetur ingenii capacitas.67 
Similarly, the existence of knowledge, affirmed by 
.. 
Descartes more or less explicitly, as we have seen, is 
constantly implied by him, as, e.g., in this passage: 
••• quisque firmiter sibi persuadeat, non ex 
magnis et obscuris rebus, sed facilibus tantum 
et magis obviis, scientias quantumlibet occultas 
esse deducendas.68 
or in this one: 
••• hoc in loco, ubi qua ratione aptiores red-
damur ad veritates unas ab allis deducendas, 
inquirimus ••• 69 
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The aptitude of the mind, a certitude likewise expli-
citly stated, is also implied in various places; for instance, 
in these lines of the Meditationes: 
••• ex quo de omnibus volui dubitare, nihil 
adhuc praeter me et Deum existere certo cog-
nevi ••• 70 
Nor is it difficult to read the implications of the mind's 
aptitude found in the following words: 
••• operae pretium esse dicimus, illa omnia, 
quae in propositione data sunt, ordine per-
lustrare, rejiciendo illa, guae ad rem non 
facere aperte videbimus ••• 71 
It appears that the mind is capable of recognizing what 
"order" is, what "data" are, what a "proposition" is, 
what "everything" is, what is "immaterial." Other si-
milar implications of the validity of our cognitive faculty 
are scattered everywhere in Descartes' methodological 
works; so Descartes "did not in practice doubt the abili-
ty of his reason to arrive at truth and certainty ••• n72 
No; nor, it appears, did he doubt this in theory, either, 
at least at times. 
*** 
In the preceding section we have examined some of 
the more important explicit and implicit certitudes that 
were present in the mind of the doubting Descartes. We 
have seen that Descartes' explanations of his own doubt 
contain countless certitudes. It is rather important to 
note here that these certitudes were, in almost every case, 
of a speculative order: their objects were, for example, 
the existence of truth, certituae, science; the aptitude 
for truth;of our individual faculties; the efficacy of 
Descartes' method of doubt; the futility of Dialectics; the 
certitude of s~lf-evident and of indubitable truths. This 
point should be borne in mind when we come to say a word 
or two about the metaphysical nature of Descartes' doubt. 
EXTENSION 
OF DOUBT 
Descartes, then, had, even at the very time 
of his doubt, many, many certitudes. But if so 
many things were, at least at times, consciously excluded 
by him from his doubt, we may ask wt.I.B.t, in Descartes' mind, 
did the doubt include? Descartes certainly meant it to 
take in doubtful things, those things "in quibus vel mini-
roam incertitudinis suspicionem reperiemus.n73 And among 
these dubitable things, it seems that he included, at least 
later on, Mathematics. For in the Principia, Descartes 
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tells us that having now freed ourselves of our supreme 
doubt, 
Non enim awplius :Ma.thema.ticae veritates nobis 
suspectae esse debent, quia sunt maxime per-
spicuae.74 
In the Meditationes, (AT, 7.70), Descartes likewise tells 
us that whereas in his su¥reme doubt he doubted the truths 
of Geon1etry and the like, ttafter I have recognized that 
there is a God,tt these truths are beyond doubt. 
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Besides "dubitable" things, and Mathematics, Geometry, 
and the like, it seems that Descartes also extended his 
doubt to the existence of his mind and body. This is in-
dicated by these words: 
••• statim post ••• non amplius dubitare potui 
quin mens existeret; ut etiam post sextam 
Meditationem, in qua corporis existentiam cog-
novi, non amplius de ipsa potui dubitare.75 
Lastly, Descartes, as we have seen, evidently meant his 
doubt to take in all sense knowledge (cf. AT, 10.514). 
CONCLUSION By way of a final note to these argullients 
for and against the universality of Desc~rtes' uoubt, we 
should like to remark the quite obvious fact that there 
is a case for both sides of this question. At one time 
Descartes seems to hold a universal doubt; at another 
time, his doubt appears to be very restricted in scope. 
To us it seems that Descartes tried hard to hold on to a 
universal doubt, but found this impossible. Consequently, 
------
he vacillated back and forth between a universal ~nd a 
non-universal doubt. In a word, he was illogical ar1d 
inconsistent. 
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CHAPTER V. 
OTHER ASPECTS OF DESCARTES' DOUBT. 
FICTITIOUS 
DOUBT? 
Having exanJined the problem of its uni versa-
lity, we may now briefly inquire into the real-
ity of Descartes' doubt. First, let us examine the evidence 
for the fictitiousness of the doubt. About the strongest 
argument is this statement in the Meditationes: 
••• revera esse aliqueru mundum, et horuines 
habere corpora, et similia, de quibus nemo 
umquam sanae mentis serio dubitavit ••• 1 
Yet, as we have seen (cf. supra, p. 43), Descartes has 
put these things within the pale of his doubt. This might 
suggest that Descartes' doubt was feigned. In the Objec-
tiones £Ym Responsionibus we do find this view of Des-
cartes' doubtt 
Quicquid dixeris, nemo erit, qui persuadeatur 
te esse persua.suru, nihil esse verum ex iis 
omnibus quae cognoveris ••• 2 
These are the strongest texts we have found for the un-
reality of Descartes' doubt. 
REAL 
DOUBT? 
Much more nuwerous are the indications that 
Descartes' doubt was a real doubt. First, there 
is Descartes' own testimony regaraing this ruatter. Surely 
he cannot be speaking of a feigned doubt in this passage: 
••• sed tandem cogor fateri nihil esse ex iis 
quae olim vera putabam, de quo non liceat dubi-
tare, idque non per inconsiderantiam vel levi-
tatem, sed propter validas et meditatas rationes; 
ideoque etiam ab iisdem, non minus quam ab aperte 
falsis, accurate deinceps assensionem ess3 
cohibendam, si quid certi velim invenire. 
And one can see a real doubt in the attitude expressed by 
this sentence: 
••• ibi tantum agebatur de summa illa dubita-
tione, quam saepe metaphysicam, hyperbolicam, 
atque ad usuw vitae nullo modo transferendaw 
esse inculcavi ••• 4 
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Vfuat Descartes says is quite true: he insisted on his doubt 
at great length. Again and again he writes of it, and 
tries -- not with much success -- to define its nature. 
Throughout his works he is defending the legality ana va-
lidity of this doubt. Now surely, this ceaseless explain-
ing, this repeated defending of his doubt is a strong in-
dication that the doubt was a real d.oubt. For had it been 
merely fictitious, Descartes could have, almost certainly 
would have,stated this fact in a simple, single bald sen-
tence; and there would have been no need for him to devote 
so many and such cautiously worded pages to the exposition 
and defence of his doubt. 
Speaking of his doubt often and at no little length, 
most of the time Descartes testifies to its realness. He 
tells us, for example, that 
••• etiamsi praeceptores mei nihil me certi 
edocuerint ••• gratias ipsis habere debeo, eas-
que nunc profecto temporis, quoniam omne id 
quod me docuerunt adeo dubium fuit, majores, 
quam si magis rationi consentaneum fuisset ••• 5 
We might quote other passages {e.g., AT, 7.263,264; 
6.33) which point to a real doubt. We shall content our-
selves with just two more. The serious tone of the words 
that follow can stand only for a very real doubt: 
Animadvert! ••• omnia semel in vita esse ever-
tenda, atque a primis fundrunentis denuo incho-
. andum ••• opportune igitur hodie ••• serio tan-
dem et libere generali huic mearum opinionum 
eversion! vacabo.6 
Finally, in one of his letters Descartes tells us in-
directly that his doubt was real. He compares his doubt 
to the doubt of the sceptics, which is a real doubt. In 
thus placing his doubt in the same category with the doubt 
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of the Pyrrhonic school, Descartes lets us know that he 
considered his own doubt as real as the doubt of the sceptics: 
Bien que les Pyrrhoniens n•ayent rien conclu de 
certain en suite d.e leurs doutes, ce n•est pas 
a dire qu'on ne le puisse. Et ie tascherois ici 
de faire voir comment on sten p~ut seruir pour 
prouuer l•existence de Dieu ••• 
So far we have seen the Ph~osopher 1 s own te~timony 
to the reality of his doubt.~ Most present day writers on 
Descartes that we have examined seem not to touch this 
aspect of the doubt at all. Those that do are all for a 
real doubt. M. Verneaux is especially clear upon this 
matter: 
••• si le doute a pour fonction de combattre une 
habitude inveteree (the habit of relying on the 
senses), 11 s•ensuit qu'il est une demarche volon-
taire et psychologiquement reelle ••• Le temps 
donne ala premi~re Meditation ••• tmanebo ob-
stinate in hac meditatione defixus' (AT, 7.23); 
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ce qui ne se comprend que si le doute doit reelle-
s'imposer A l'esprit, "balancern les anciens 
prejuges (ib., 7.22) et desaccoutumer d'y donner 
creance. 
Il n•y a done pas lieu, selon nous, d'opposer son 
caract~re methodique et son caract~re reelle ••• 
Le Discours, destine au grand public, peut bien 
en quelques endroits laisser entendre que Des-
cartes se contente d'ur! doute fictif, mais l'en-
semble des explications donnees coupe court l 
cette alternative ••• 8 
Father Mahony very plainly asserts the reality of the 
doubt: 
All his previous knowledge, he ••• doubted, 
not merely by a negative, but b,y a real, posi-
tive doubt ••• 9 
One more indication of the reality of the doubt may 
be given. As every one knows, Descartes was very careful 
to form for himself a provisional code of morals: 
••• affin que ie ne demeurasse point irresolu 
en mes actions, pendant que la raison mtobli-
geroit de l'estre en mes iugemens •1. ie me formay une morale par prouision ••• 0 
If Descartes' doubt had been fictitious, what need had he 
to draw up rules of conduct? Besides, when a man indulges 
in a fictitious doubt, he can scarcely be said "to be 
irresolute in his judgments!" 
Since it would seem that Descartes' doubt was a real 
doubt, it, of course, follows that he should have excluded 
from it all self-evident truths, -- consequently the apti-
tude for truth of the mind and of our faculties of knowing: 
of the senses, of our reasoning power, our immediate 
analytic judgments, our consciousness. 
In the case of a real doubt, Descartes should also 
have refrained from ever including in it all those count-
less derived certitudes for which he possessed objective 
evidence. Such derived certitudes he did r~ve about the 
62 
usefulness of a classical education, for instru1ce, or about 
the existence of certitude in others, or about mathematics, 
geometry, and like subjects. If Descartes did at any time 
include any such self-evident or derived certitudes in his 
doubt, as he seems to have done, his "real" doubt in re-
gard to these things was no more than illusory. For one 
cannot really doubt that which one sees to be so. 
METAPHYSICAL 
DOUBT 
*** 
We have shown that very probably Descartes' 
doubt was not universal, and that it seems 
to have been real. It remains to ex~lain its metaphysical 
nature. Descartes himself affirms this quality of the 
doubt: 
••• clare patet, me ibi tantum loquutum esse 
de morali sciendi modo, qui sufficit ad vitam 
regendam, et quem a Metaphysico illo, de quo 
hie questio est, plurimuw differre saepe 
inculcavi ••• 11 
••• studiose omnia quae ad pietatem, ac gene-
raliter ad mores spectant, ab hac abdicatione, 
exceperim ••• 12 
M. Verneaux throws considerable light on the meaning of 
this adjective "metaphysical," as Descartes uses it of his 
doubt: 
••• le doute est souvent nomme par Descartes ••• 
un doute meta~hysique. D'abord, parce que 
crest une demarche complexe, inaccoutumee, et 
fort eloignee du sens comwun. Ensuite, parce 
qu'il ne doit pas ~tre transporte dans la vie 
pratique, wais strictement cantone dans la sp~­
culation. Mais m~taphysique surtout, parce 
qu'il est le fondement de la metaphysique 
comme science apodictique.l3 
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This third meaning of metaphysical is further distinguished 
in a two-fold manner: 
En tant m~me que "metaphysique," il a une double 
fonction: l'une,generale, concerne la certitude 
des principes et des facult~s de connaissance; 
l•autre,speciale, concerne l•existence d'un ~tre 
pouvant servir de principe .h. la connaissance du 
reel ••• Methode pour assurer les fondements de 
notre connaissance du vrai et de notre connaissance 
de l'existence, le doute est egalement aans les 
deux cas m~t.aphysique .14 
To tell the truth, although Descartes claims that he 
has spoken at great length of his metaphysical doubt, he 
never clearly tells us just what he himself understands by 
a metaphysical doubt. From his use of the term, it seexns 
that he mistakenly believed tnere was but one true kind 
of certitude, absolute or metaphysical certitude (cf. 
Chapter 1). This, of course, is untrue. HYpothetical 
....... 
certitude is as truly certitude as absolute certitude. 
Psychologically there is little difference between the two. 
From this it follows that if I am morally certain of 
son1ething, I cannot doubt that thing, not even with a 
metaphysical doubt, whatever that term may be taken to 
mean. At the most, I can ex&nine that moral certitude, to 
see whether it may not indeed be a metaphysical certitude. 
To do this, however, is not to doubt the fact which forms 
the content of my moral certitude; it is at most to 
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doubt whether the moral certitude may not be metaphysical. 
If, then, by metaphysical doubt Descartes understood an 
actual doubt concerning the contents of his moral certitudes, 
he was illogical. One cannot doubt that of which one is 
certain, though that certitude be merely moral. Descartes, 
it seems, was guilty o~ precisely this error. 
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CONCLUSION. 
In our Introduction we hinted at the obscurity which 
surrounds Descartes' doubt. The exten~ion and nature of 
this doubt is one of Descartes' contradictory ambiguities 
ambiguities he makes no clean-cut effort to reconcile. 
By way of conclusion, we should like briefly to sum 
up the evidence on each side of the question this thesis 
set out to answer: Was Descartes' doubt universal? 
We found many statements in Descartes himself which 
seemed to indicate a universal doubt. Descartes tells 
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us (cf. p. 17, su,t.~ra) that he wished "to examine all his 
opinions;" for, he says, we :a~y doubt about "all things." 
Certainly he seems to have doubted at least all the know-
ledge that came to him through his senses. However, as 
far as sense knowledge is concerned, we saw that Descartes' 
doubt could at most have been but illusory. Such was 
Descartes' own testimony for a universal doubt. 
As for the testimony of others, we saw that M. Ver-
neaux and Mr. Sewall held the universality of the doubt. 
Finally, we ventured the opinion that Descartes' 
"universal" doubt, in so far as it was "universal" was not 
a doubt, but an "abstraction." This seemed to be the 
import of the well known exa~ple of the barrel and apples. 
Numerous as were the statements favouring a universal 
doubt, those indicating a non-universal doubt were far -
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more numerous. To begin with, we heard Descartes denying 
the possibility or a universal doubt. We heard him say 
that he aimed to reject only dubitable, uncertain, unrea-
soned opinions. When he spoke of doubting "all things," 
Descartes sometimes quite apparently meant only "all dubi-
table things.'' But in this he was illogical; for it was 
impossible to doubt some of the things he considered "dubi-
table." 
We saw, further, that M. Chevalier, and Mr. Keeling, 
both considered Descartes' doubt as non-universal. 
Such was the general testimony backing the non-uni-
versality of the doubt. The particular evidence also sup-
porting this view was very copious. First there were the 
many explicit certitudes accompanying Descartes' explana-
tions of his doubt. Chief or these certitudes were those 
concerning non-existing things and mathematics. Then there 
were the certitudes dealing with certitude itself, and 
with the existence of truth and falsity. Moreover, we 
found Descartes to be sure of the existence or four facul-
ties of knowledge, and of the trustworthiness of these 
faculties. Besides this, Descartes doubted neither self-
evident judgments nor ideas. He was certain of the apti-
tude of his cognitive faculties to attain truth. And we 
must not omit to mention the capital certitude on which 
Descartes built his philosophy, the certitude of his own 
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existence. Indeed, that truth was the "limit to his doubt." 
Then there were the important certitudes dealing with faith 
and with n1orality. Likewise worthy of mention, are the 
certitudes concerning the efficacy of his method and the 
futility of dialectics. Last among the explicit certitudes 
were those concerning the study of Language, of Poetry, 
Rhetoric, Medicine, etc. 
Mingled with these explicit certitudes we also dis-
covered countless implicit certitudes. We found Descartes 
not merely explicitly, but also implicitly certain of the 
efficacy of his method, of the existence of knowledge, of 
the aptitude of the mind, of the indubitability of self-
evident truths. 
Such is the evidence for and against the universality 
of the doubt. The reader is free to embrace whatever side 
of the question he prefers. To us it seems that the hodge-
podge of doubts and certitudes which we have examined shows 
Descartes' inconsistency and lack of logic. He wanted 
"to doubt all;" he tried to persuade himself he did and 
built his system as if he did -- but found h~ could not. 
As a result, his writings show illogicality, strife, va-
cillation. At times he calls his doubt universal; at 
other times, and far more frequently, he tells us that 
it is not universal. 
-
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